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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.JOHN B. GARSIDE and
BETTY B. GARSIDE,

Plaintiffs an.d Respondents,

-vs-

Case No.
10364

DE LOYD HILLSTEAD,
Defendant and Apprlla11t.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATFRE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's
motion to set aside a def a ult judgment obtained against
him on tlw basis of service of process under the provisionl' of the l'tah Non-Resident Motorist Statute, when
defendant did not receive copies of the Summons and
Complaint nor have notice that any law suit had been
initiated against him until after the matter had gone
to judgint>nt by default.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On ~ ovt>mber 10, 19(14, the Lower Court granted
a d('lfault judgment in favor of plaintiff J olm B. Gar1

side and against defendant for the sum of $7,3:30.87 and
in favor of plaintiff, Betty B. Garside, and against
defendant for the sum of $11,072.38. Upon learning of
the default judgment defendant filed his answer to plaintiffs' complaint and at the same time made a motion
to have the judgment set aside and the matter litigated
upon its merits. Defendant's motion ·was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an order vacating the default judgment and order rewarding the case to the District Court
for trial on its merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 12, 1961, defendant De Loyd Hi11stead
was the driver of an automobile that was involved in
an accident on U. S. Highway 189, in Hoytsville, Summit
County, Utah, with an automobile driven by .John B.
Garside and in which Betty B. Garside was a passenger.
At that time defendant was a resident of the State of
California residing at 9612 Alowood, Garden Grove,
California.
Three years later on September 8, 196-±, plaintiffs
filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake
County seeking judgment against defendant for property
damage and personal injury resulting from the automobile accident (R-1). With their complaint, plaintiffs
filed an affidavit alleging that a copy of ther summons
and complaint was mailed to defendant at 9612 Alwood,
Garden Grove, California (R. 4-5). Copies of the Sum2

wons and complaint w<·n~ also sPrved upon the f.ipcretary
of Stat<' of tlw Statt> of l'tah (R. GO).
Tlw copies of th<> summons and complaint which
plaintiffs mail<·d to dL•f Pndant WL·n• nt>ver received by
hilll and <·ons<'quently lw had no notice that an action
Juul !wen intiab:•d against him nor did lw have an opportunity to d<>frnd in said action (R. 18).
10, 19G-1-, the District Court of Salt
Lah County, ~larcl'llus K. Snow, Judge, granted judg111,.nt in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant for
th<' au:gn·gatl' sum of $18,4o:3.:25 (R. 7,8). No notice of
tli<· granting or entry of the judgment was ever mailed
tn dt>fen<lant. ( SPP reeorcr). It was not until January 1,
1%5, that plaintiffs' attornPy sent a letter to defendant
at 1:2:201 i><'a('ock Avemw, Apartnwnt #2, Garden Grove,
California, advising him that judgment had been taken
against him. This lPttL·r was rect>ived by defendant who
imm<'<liatt>l~· thereafter contacted his insurance carrier
of tlH· filing of thr lawsuit and tht> resulting $18,403.25
dt>fanlt judgrnt>nt.
(In ~owmlwr

l-pon n•cPiving the information the insurance carrier
C(Jntad<·d counsl'l in Utah requesting that action be
tahn to havp the default judgment vacated and the
matter disvos<>d of upon its mPrits. Accordingly, on
Ft>bruary 25, 19()3, an answPr to plaintiffs' complaint
on a motion to sl't aside tht> default judgment was filt>d
stating that ckfrndant had no knowledge of the legal
aetion !weans<· lw had nPvt>r rt>ceivf>d notice of its initiation (R. lS). Tlw motion was argtwd beforp the Honor-
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able Marcellus K. Snow, on the basis and with the
understanding of the facts set forth herein. After being
"fully advised in the premises," Judge Snow denied
defendant's motion to vacate the judgment against him.
(R. 20)

It is from the denial of defendant's motion to set
aside plaintiffs' judgment against him that this appeal
is taken.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND WAS IN ERROR AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN NOT SETTING THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ASIDE.
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares:
For good cause shown the
aside an entry of default and, if
default has been entered, may
aside in accordance with Rule 60

court may set
a judgment by
likewise set it
(b).

The pertinent provisions of Rule 60 (b) are as
follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . ( 7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
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The rnle thPn goes on to say:

The motion shall be made with a reasonable
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4) not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order or
proceeding was entered or taken.
It should he noted that no time limitation is prescribed
for relief sought under rPason number (7) of the rule.

Tht.· Rules of Civil Procedure referred to are codification of the attitude and policy of this State relative
to the setting aside of default judgments with the purpo:-;P of setting up guide lives for tlw trial Court in the
exercise of the sound discretion in such matters. One
of the reasons for the adoption of the Rules was to remove many of the technical difficulties envoked in pleadmg and to avoid the inequities resulting from a failure
of a party or his legal representative to properly adhere
to the rather sturgent rules of code pleading by which
man~· eases were won and lost.

As a gt>neral rule, the courts incline toward granting
reliPf from defaults and default judgments and will attt>mpt to grant judgment upon the merits of a claim
unless the default is the result of inexcusable neglect of
the party in default or where it would be inequitable to
set it aside. Cutler 'CS. Haycock, 32 F. 354, 90 P. 897.

Tn the case of Byland i·s. Crooke et al, m 208 P. 504,
the Ftah Supreme Court stated on page 505:
Our trial courts are usually very liberal in
vacating and setting aside default judgments entered against a defaulting party by a reason of a
mistake, inadventure, or excusable neglect, or in
5

cases where there has been fraud or deceit practiced. Under our practice it is generally regarded
as an abitse of discretion for the trial court not to
vacate and set aside a default judgment when
there is any reasonable grounds for doing so, and
timely application is made. (Emphasis added)
It is recognized that the moving party should be
diligent and show that he was prevented from avoiding
the default judgment because of circumstances over
which he had no control. This concept is stated in Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Company et al., 260 P. 2d 7-11, at
page 743:
Discretion mus tbe exercised in furtherance
of justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to the end that a
party may have a hearing: Hurd vs. Ford, 74 Utah
46, 276 Pac. 908. However, the movant must show
tha the has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control. Peterson vs. Crozier, 29
Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860.

The case of Cutler vs. Haycock, supra, involves a different kind of lawsuit than the instant case but the
statments therein by our Superem Court are of assistance in the consideration of default matters generally.
At page 900 of the Pacific Reporter the Court said:
As has been well said in all doubtful cases
the general rule of courts is to incline towards
granting relief from the default and to bring
about judgment on the merits.
Continuing the Court went on to say:
This rule, as appears from the authorities, is
of almost universal application, and is defeated
only in cases where the default is the result of
6

inexcusable neglect of the party in default, or
where it would be inequitable to set it aside.
(Emphasis added)

The Court went to state that the trial court had abused
its discretion in not setting aside the default because
of tlw following reasons:
1. Defendant had made reasonable efforts to com-

ply with the law.

•)

The case arose in a sparsely settled country
when communications were slow.
:3. Good faith and reasonable effort to make a
defense are always elements to be considered
in each case.
4. There was no indication that plaintiff would
have suffered either inconvenience or loss of
any kind by setting aside the default.
5. Plaintiff had not gone to great expense and
sacrifice of time to prepare for trial which
effort and expense would have to be duplicated
if the other party was permitted to defend.
In considering what has been said thus far and
comparing other cases and the applicable rules to the
instant case the inequities are f orceably brought to appellant's attention. In the year 1961 while a resident of
California, as the driver of an automobile, was involved
in an accident in Utah. At that time he gave plaintiffs
his address in California. In 1964, plaintiffs filed suit
in l'tah against defendant and mailed copies of the
summons and complant to him at the place of his residence in 1964. Defendant never received the copies of
the summons and complaint which plaintiffs mailed to
him. Naturally, because he had no notice of the suit,
7

no pleadings were filed on defendant's behalf nor was
any appearance made by him or on his behalf. Again,
naturally judgment by default was taken against him.
Interestingly enough no notice of any kind relative to
the judgment was made to def end until some 60 dan
after it was taken and this was in the form of a letter
mailed to a different address than the summons and
complaint were mailed to. This letter advised defendant
that plaintiffs were judgment creditors of his in tlw
total aggregate sum of $18,403.25. Upon receiving this
intelligence defendant responded immediately by contacting his insurance carrier of the policy under which
he has an omnibus insured. Every reasonable effort was
taken thereafter for defendant to defend himself against
plaintiffs' claims.
Certainly the equities in this case are on the side
of defend.ant. To be considered are the following items:
a. The lapse of 3 years from the time of the
accident to the commencement of the lawsuit
against defendant.
b. The mailing of copies of a summons and
complaint to defendant at an address plaintiff~
knew was three years old.
c. The withholding of notice to defendant of
judgment against him until two month time had
elapsed.
d. The sending of a letter to defendant at a
completely different address than where the summons and complaint were mailed advising defendant of the judgment.
e. The distance of approximately one thom;and miles between defendants residence and the
place where the lawsuit was commenced.
8

f. The fact that defendant had not actual
notice of the suit until judgment had been taken
against him.
g. The filing of the motion to have the default
set aside and the filing of an answer in an effort
to protect defendant against the claims of plaintiffs and to have this matter disposed of on the
merits.
b. The fact that plaintiffs' knew defendant
had not responded to their summons and complaint and consequently they and their attorney
did not sacrifice a great time and expense to
obtain their judgment which would have to be
duplicated if defendant is allowed to defend in this
action.
i. The fact that although several months time
elapsed before defendant took action in an attempt
to protect himself from the judgment by default,
defendant did act quickly and reasonably after
becoming aware of his position.
It is appellant's position that these facts coupled

with the law of this State and the attitude of he Courts
relative to default matters establishes that the District
Court in the instant case abused its discretion in not
setting aside the default judgment against defendant
and in not permitting him to defend against plaintiffs'
claims.
In Ney vs. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114, the
Court asserted:
The statutory authority of trial courts to set
aside judgments obtained by default has been
literally 'construed to the end that there be tried
on the merits, beginning with our earliest decisions. In the recent case of Warren vs. Dixon
9

Ranch Co., we had occasion to review the policv
considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal construction, thus:
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed tu
relieve a.gainst harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may occur through procedural
difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party,
or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense!'' (Emphasis added)
And in Mayhe~ vs. Standard Gilsonite Company,
14 U. 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951, it was held that it is an abuse
of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear and timely application is
made to set aside.
1Let it be understood that the conduct of plaintiffs
and their counsel in delaying two months before sending
defendant a letter advising of the default judgment when
they knew defendant was not aware that a suit had been
filed against him was the cause of the time lapse between
the granting of the judgment and defendant's motion to
have it set aside. However, upon receipt of information
of what had occurred defendant application to set the
default judgment was timely. Because of the equities
of the case and because the allowance of a vacation of
a default judgment is a creature of equity as stated in
Ney vs. Harrison, supra, the trial court abused its discretion as per the court's declaration in Mayhem vs.
Standard Gilsonite Company, supra.
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In order to fully appreciate defendant's position in
this matter it is felt that the certain aspects of the
Utah Non-Resident Motorist Statute should be discussed.
The pertinent provisions of Title 41, Section 12,
Paragraph 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are as follows:
The use and operation by a nonresident or
his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the
highways of the State of Utah shall be deemed
an appointment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State of the State of Utah to be his
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be
served all legal processes in any action or proceeding against him growing out of such use or
operation of a motor vehicle. . . . Service of such
process shall be made by serving a copy thereof
upon the Secretary of State - and such service
shall be sufficient service upon the said nonresident provided, that notice of such service and a
copy of the process be within ten days thereafter
sent by mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at
his last known address.
The Record indicates that plaintiffs adhered to the statutory provisions but also show that defendant did not
receive the copy of the summons and complaint which
plaintiffs' mailed to him. Whether or not a defendant
is entitled to actual notice under this statute is important
to this inquiry.
Nonresident motorist acts generally provide that
i,;pecified notice of the substituted service, or a copy of
the summons and complaint be sent to the defendant by
mail. Many statutes require that the notice be sent to
defendant by registered mail with return receipt re11

quested. Some courts have construed such provision to
mean that defendant must have actual notice of the
pendency of the action before jurisdiction over him is
acquired. Alexander vs. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S\V 2d
519, Muncie vs. Westcraft Corporation, 58 \Vash. 2d 36,
360 P. 2d 744. However, other courts have held that
there is no absolute requirement to good and valid service
that the defendant actually receive notice .
.Most such statutes usually provide, as does the Utah
Non-Resident :Motorist Statute, that notice of the subsituted service of process be mailed to the defendant's
last konwn address. This does not mean necessarily
the last address known to plaintiff, but the last known
address of defendant which is reasonably certain to
ascertain. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway
Traffic, Section 870, and the cases these cited.
Statutory provisions relating to the mailing of notice
to defendant's last known address are calculated to give
defendant adequate notice of the pendancy of the action
or proceeding and to make it reasonably certain that
notice will reach defendant. 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles,
Section 502.

Alexander vs. Bush, supra, held that the statute
providing for constructive notice on nonresident motorists by service of process on the Secretary of State
required "actual value" of the pendency of an action to
bes given to the defendant before jurisdiction over him
was acquired. See Annotation 138 ALR 1476.
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Although there is no Utah case covering the exact
point in question here, our Supreme Court has commented on the provision of of the Utah nonresident
.Jfotorist Statute. In construing the substituted service
statute in question, Mr. Justice Henriod's separate con('urring opinion in Teague vs. District Court of the Third
Judicial District In and For Salt Lake County, 4 U. 2d
147, 289 P. 2d 331 (1955), state:
It is my opinion that the statute for substituted service involved in this case, very carefully
should be administered, since, admittidly assigned
to protect our own residents against transient
hit-run non-residents, it would be used as an instrument for oppression if one having a poor or
unmeritorious case could refrain from serving
process personally, having ample opportunity so
to do, and then wait until he reasonably is sUie
defendant is far and away, and unable to return
to defend himself, before substituted service is
accomplished.

Appellant agrees with the principles stated by Justice Henriod. In doing so appellant does not take the
position that the conduct of plaintiff was the result of
design in waiting three years before filing the suit
aganst plaintiff and then sending notice thereof to a
three year old address of defendant without making
any effort to ascertain defendant's present address and
in waiting two months before advising defendant by
mail of the filing of the suit and the resulting default
judgment against him. But even though plaintiffs may
not have accomplished what they did by design the result
of their action was to make an instrument of oppression
of the nonresident l\Iotorist Statute against defendant.
13

COXCLUSION
Appellant urges upon the 'Court that the Trial Court
erred in failing to spt aside plaintiffs' default judgment
and allowing defendant to answ<:>r the Complaint and
have his "dav
. in Court" and to have the matter fairlv.
heard on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
TEL CHARLIER
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
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